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Like other post-colonial states, Papua New 
Guinea continues to grapple with issues 
pertaining to land. In addition to being an 
important source of group identity, in resource 
rich Papua New Guinea, land is an important 
source of economic prosperity. Vigorous debate 
however, has ensued over the relationship 
between customary land tenure systems and 
economic growth, with official land registration 
being proposed as a more economically viable 
alternative to local systems of land tenure. 
This discussion paper, based on a seminar at 
AusAID, provides an overview of perspectives 
on land registration, which as demonstrated by 
violent protests in 1995 and 2000 is a highly 
contentious issue in Papua New Guinea. 
Peter Larmour provides a brief theoretical 
introduction followed by a chronological 
overview of official thinking about land 
registration in Papua New Guinea, concluding 
with a practical consideration of the mechanics 
of registering land in the country. Tim 
Curtin and Hartmut Holzknecht then provide 
competing perspectives on land registration, 
with Curtin advocating the establishment of 
individual land ownership in Papua New Guinea 
in order to accelerate economic growth, a 
task for which he believes customary land 
tenure is ill equipped. Conversely, Holzknecht 
argues that customary land tenure systems are 
highly productive (drawing upon the example 
of a motivated and productive community in 
Morobe Province), and that in any case, the 
Melanesian socio-political context is likely to 
confound attempts at land reform. 
LAND REGISTRATION IN PAPUA 
NEW GUINEA: FIFTY YEARS OF 
CONTENTION
Peter Larmour
‘Customary land tenure’ consists of informal 
rights and obligations that precede the 
introduction of colonial land legislation, and 
continue to exist in parallel with it. In 
many parts of the developing world traditional 
and informal systems of land tenure coexist 
and sometimes conflict with land legislation 
promulgated by a central, previously colonial, 
government. Custom may be officially 
recognised as an alternative to law, for some 
places or circumstances, or for indigenous 
people. Or the introduced legislation may simply 
be ignored, unknown or irrelevant outside the 
big cities, or in the shanty towns and squatter 
settlements that surround them. Over 98% of 
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the land in PNG is classified as customary, 
and traditional claims are often made over the 
remaining ‘alienated’ land.
Land registration or land titling aims to 
formalise, and give legal effect to these 
customary rights and relationships. It involves 
investigation, survey, and registration as well as 
the creation of an on-going system to manage 
dealings in registered titles, once they have been 
created. It is partly a process of extending the 
reach of legislation to include new places, and 
new objects. It is also a process of discovery 
and recognition. The extralegal arrangements 
already exist. Traditional landowners, for 
example, are said to know where their 
boundaries are – it is a matter of registering 
them, and allowing the title to be used for 
collateral. The process and effect of registration, 
of course, also changes them.
The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights
The international orthodoxy used to be 
that the absence of title was an obstacle to 
development. It was based on what Platteau 
(1996, 1999) characterises as an ‘evolutionary 
theory’ of land rights, which he decomposed 
into two elements. First, indigenous land 
tenure arrangements were evolving in the face 
of population pressure and commercialisation 
(as he says, the ‘flexibility’ of custom is 
‘tirelessly emphasised’ by scholars, 1999: 3). This 
evolution tends towards individualisation and 
formalisation. The second element is a public 
sector response to this spontaneous evolution. 
By providing titles, governments can reduce the 
disputes that result from the changes and induce 
other economic benefits. Farmers with title will 
be more willing and able to invest, mortgage 
and sell their land (and governments better able 
to tax it). These sort of arguments underpinned 
land titling schemes throughout Africa, Asia 
and the Pacific.
They have been more recently expressed 
in Hernando de Soto’s influential book The 
Mystery of Capital (2000), which celebrates the 
entrepreneurial abilities of the poor, and the 
informal institutions of loans and rents they 
create outside the formal legal system. He argues 
that countries failed to develop because their 
legal systems were unable to convert assets held 
by the poor, including their land rights, into 
capital, which they could use to grow rich. 
These arguments are plausible. They 
sometimes have less resonance among people 
who, through colonial history, corruption or 
post-colonial conflict, see government 
intervention as a source of insecurity rather 
than security. ‘Individualisation’ of communally 
owned land may challenge local values, even 
if local farmers often, in fact, farm 
individualistically. The story also depends on a 
number of other circumstances being in place 
– banks willing to lend, farmers willing to 
mortgage land to borrow, and projects that are 
worth lending for. 
Research Results
The evidence for the effectiveness of 
customary land registration as it emerged from 
sub-Saharan Africa was at best ‘inconclusive’ 
(Platteau 1999: 6). There was no discernable 
impact of registration on investment behaviour. 
Customary rights were often very secure, and 
negotiable. Markets in land were emerging 
without title. Lack of opportunities deterred 
investment more than lack of credit, and in 
any case farmers were reluctant to put their 
land at risk. The process of registration created 
disputes rather than resolving them. Where land 
was registered, the records were rarely kept up 
to date. Registration could not grasp complex 
bundles of rights, and so increased rather 
than decreased transaction costs. Beyond semi 
urban situations, the cost effectiveness of 
centralised land registers versus decentralised 
informal mechanisms was doubtful. There were 
also unwelcome or unexpected effects on 
distribution, as registration tended to favour the 
rich, well educated, well connected and male. 
Similar conclusions were drawn by Atwood 
(1990), who noticed that clarification of 
land rights might reduce transaction costs for 
outsiders, but increase them for insiders, who 
now had to pay survey and registration fees. It 
could also create as much as reduce uncertainty. 
Modelling by Sjaastad and Bromley (1997) 
raised questions about the flow of causation. 
Rather than tenure determining markets, they 
found tenures adjusted to markets that grew up, 
or failed to, for other reasons.
Empirical evidence of the non-effects of 
registration was found quite independently of 
the African research, in late colonial Solomon 
Islands. It helped put the nail in the coffin of 
colonial schemes that politicians were ready to 
dump for other more political reasons (Neilsen 
1979, Totorea 1979a, 1979b) 
Official Thinking about Land Registration in 
PNG
The development of official thinking about 
customary land registration in PNG can 
be divided into roughly four periods: a 
‘modernising’ period in the 1950s and 1960s; 
  Land Registration in Papua New Guinea: Competing Perspectives
3
official networks and study tours, the nationalist 
model was developed through a Commission of 
Enquiry and the consultants they hired. These 
consultants were academics rather than colonial 
officials, and they brought to bear a different 
set of models: from Maori land tenure in New 
Zealand, and from other Pacific Islands, rather 
than Africa. The break can be seen in PNG 
in 1971, when Dr Alan Ward, a New Zealand 
historian, intervened in parliamentary debates 
about the Kenyan model.
The bills were running into opposition from 
several directions: the legal profession, who 
objected to the administrative provisions, and 
from Papua New Guinean politicians, who 
objected to lack of consultation (Bredmeyer 
1975). Ward was then a visiting academic at 
the University of Papua New Guinea. The paper 
that he circulated among members was entitled 
`Agricultural Revolution, Handle With Care’ 
(Ward 1972). In it Ward sharply criticised the 
assumptions behind the bills, and predicted 
dire consequences if they were enacted. The 
paper provided alternative arguments to those of 
Simpson, Lawrence and Fleming, and drew on 
New Zealand policies towards Maori land rather 
than British policies towards African land, for 
examples and warnings. Newly elected Papua 
New Guinean MPs were already suspicious 
of the legislation, and the uproar forced 
the colonial government to withdraw it 
and set up a Commission of Enquiry into 
Land Matters instead. Ward then became a 
consultant to Papua New Guinea’s Commission 
of Enquiry into Land Matters (Ward 1983). The 
Commission recommended a less individualistic 
system of registering group titles and conditional 
freeholds. In the 1980s, legislation allowing for 
systematic and sporadic registration was drafted 
and passed by two provincial governments (East 
Sepik and East New Britain), but the national 
framework within which it was to operate never 
emerged. 
The Liberal Wave
The third wave of transfer was organised by 
a conservative think tank called the Institute 
of National Affairs, which was established in 
Papua New Guinea in 1976, funded by local 
businesses. Its influence on government was 
institutionalised in a National Development 
Forum, which brought businessmen and senior 
ministers together. 
It would invite distinguished North 
American scholars to look at current issues 
of concern to the private sector. The models 
proposed drew on the lively tradition of Public 
a nationalist reaction to it at independence; 
a ‘liberal’ period in the 1980s; and the 
current period of World Bank interest and 
demonstrations against it.
The Modernising Period
In what was called ‘systematic adjudication’, 
government teams would move through the 
country, region by region, interviewing farmers, 
surveying boundaries, adjudicating disputes and 
registering the results. Scattered holdings might 
be consolidated. Individuals or groups might be 
registered as owners. Thereafter any dealings 
in land would take place through the register. 
The system originated in colonial Sudan, and 
was taken up in Kenya, from where it was 
transmitted to Solomon Islands, Papua New 
Guinea and Vanuatu (then called the New 
Hebrides). It was transmitted by a group 
of officials in the British Colonial Office, 
which later became the Overseas Development 
Administration then the Department for 
International Development. Their careers had 
intersected in Kenya, and their experience was 
incorporated in a body of doctrine by Rowton 
Simpson in his Land Law and Registration (1976). 
Simpson had discussed the Kenyan system 
with Hasluck (the Australian minister 
responsible for Papua New Guinea), as early as 
1957, before the introduction of the 1962–3 
package of Papua New Guinea land ordinances. 
His later critical report on the way they 
were working (Simpson 1971), led to the new 
Land Adjudication Bill drafted by Fleming. 
The Kenyan example of systematic adjudication, 
transmitted through Simpson, Fleming and 
Lawrence, was explicitly referred to in the 
preparation of the 1970 package of legislation in 
Papua New Guinea. Two Ministerial Members 
of the House of Assembly, and a separate 
`technical party’ of the Papua New Guinea 
Director of Lands and two other expatriate 
officials visited Kenya to see how the system 
worked. 
However the Kenyan model was only 
partly transferred to Papua New Guinea. 
Simpson reluctantly recommended that the 
legislation continue to provide for individual 
applicants (Simpson 1971: 11-12). Secondly, the 
registration process stopped at the `Record of 
Existing Rights’ (Bredmeyer 1975: 65-69). There 
was no provision for subsequent consolidation.
The Nationalist Reaction
A nationalist reaction saw the transfer of the 
Kenyan model abandoned, or dressed in new 
clothes. Where it had been transferred through 
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
4
Choice and the New Institutional Economics, 
introducing a fresh set of ideas into what 
had become a rather tired debate between 
modernists and nationalists. Some research in 
the public choice tradition had dealt specifically 
with customary land tenure, including North 
American Indian land rights (eg Bottomley 
1963; Trosper 1978).
Knetsch and Trebilcock’s 1981 report on 
land policy was influential on government 
policy in the early 1980s. Its argument 
was universalist: Melanesian landowners were 
assumed to be self interested maximisers, 
like everyone else. Their report led to the 
establishment of a joint public-private sector 
`task force’ whose report provided the basis for 
Lands Department’s drafting of new legislation 
for the sporadic, rather than systematic, 
registration of customary land rights. The 
legislation was abandoned, particularly after a 
critical report on it by a consultant for the 
World Bank (Noronha 1985).
Robert Cooter’s (1991) proposal, as 
consultant to the INA, was the subtlest. He 
rejected the centralisation of Kenyan and other 
models of adjudication, proposing instead a 
‘common law’ process that built decisions on 
custom in particular cases. Instead of trying to 
register all land under a central stature, local 
courts would be encouraged to record and share 
their decisions, made as and when conflicts 
occurred. Over time, he argued, a practice based, 
nation wide, common law would be built up out 
of ad hoc decisions, generalised, adapted, and 
shared through legal conferences and training. 
In this case an external adviser recommended 
an endogenous process, not borrowing from 
Africa, or looking to neighbours. Cooter was 
also realistic about the costs of a centralised 
approach. 
Enter the Bank
The line between the liberal advice of the 
INA, and the advice of the World Bank was 
not very clear, not least because the Bank spoke 
with different voices, particularly by the late 
1990s. It became influential in PNG in the early 
1990s, as the government turned to it for loans 
(Kavanamur 1998). Its consultants generally 
took a conventional economic approach, but 
were also less suspicious of state activity than 
the INA’s public choice advocates. Whereas 
the INA had relied on lobbying, seminars and 
publications, the Bank had a more powerful 
instrument for transferring its ideas in loan 
conditions. In 1995, it proposed the following 
condition:
Complete framework legislation for 
customary land registration. Complete 
registration in East New Britain and 
Sepik 
Once leaked, the proposed condition 
provoked a nationalist backlash led by NGOs. 
Students demonstrated, government vehicles 
were burned, and there were demonstrations in 
the Highlands. The government quickly backed 
down, and the Bank dropped the condition 
(Filer 2000: 32-37).
Conclusions
There has been a softening in the orthodox 
view. Ian Williamson, for example, has been 
closely associated with World Bank titling 
programs and has a professional interest in the 
process as a professor of surveying. He argues 
that registration systems must be ‘appropriate’ 
or they will end up doing more harm than 
good. He also identifies a shift in World 
Bank thinking, quoting a senior Bank official 
saying that security did not necessarily mean 
freehold, and that in any case rights must 
be adjudicated systematically, not ad hoc in 
response to applications from individual farmers 
(2001: 12).
Platteau concludes that African governments 
should only intervene if and after local and 
informal methods are no longer reliable (1996: 
76). How, then, to decide?
Cost and Benefits
The costs and benefits can be thought about 
in different ways: in relation to subsidies, as 
opportunity costs for government, and in the 
transaction costs to users of formal over informal 
systems. Systematic adjudication may be more 
efficient and fairer than sporadic registration in 
response to demand from particular owners. But 
it requires a higher rate of subsidy. Figures from 
a Solomon Islands scheme in the 1960s illustrate 
some of the issues: costs at then current prices 
to the government were about $6 per acre, with 
beneficiaries charged only 5% of the commercial 
rate for survey fees, and $5 per parcel, plus 
25c per acre (Hughes 1969 quoted in Larmour 
1984: 75). Sporadic registration, where the costs 
can be sheeted home to the beneficiaries, may 
require less subsidy, but at the cost of dangers 
of land grabbing. In practice, as with other 
public services in developing countries, the 
middle class may be able to attract subsidies to 
themselves, at the expense of the government 
budget, and equity. 
There are also opportunity costs in devoting 
highly skilled survey and adjudication resources 
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towards land registration, rather than (say) the 
courts (as Cooter’s common law proposal, above, 
suggested). 
A ‘transaction costs’ approach that looks at 
the costs and benefits of making and securing 
agreements would not prejudge the outcomes of 
choice between formal and informal institutions. 
In some cases registration may be more efficient 
than self management, but in other cases not, 
and the result is likely to be a mixture (Larmour 
1990).
Implementation
Registration can also be considered as a 
problem in policy implementation. Research on 
the conditions for successful implementation 
finds simple policies, consistent with local 
values, are more likely to be implemented than 
complex policies that challenge local values 
(Rose 1993: 118-142; Parsons 1995: 486). The 
process may be one of dialogue and interaction, 
as much as the imposition of a blueprint. 
Experimentation
PNG’s provincial system allows different 
legal approaches to be applied, and the results 
(if any) compared. Experiments began in East 
Sepik and East New Britain in the 1980s and 
the results could be systematically compared. 
Funds might be available for provincial level 
experiments, provided there was a commitment 
to compare and evaluate the results. 
Good Governance
Platteau suggests that the success of 
registration will depend on the quality character 
and capacity of the state – ‘good governance’ in 
the sense that donors define it. For example, it 
was this that tipped the balance in Ensminger’s 
account of institutional choice in post colonial 
Kenya. Using a transaction cost approach she 
describes how the nomadic Orma people began 
to make more use of state institutions and 
market relationships. One of the factors that 
determined their choices was the relatively 
benign face that state institutions presented 
in the 1980s, when power was being 
decentralised and there was less corruption 
and harassment than before (1996: 157-161). 
So a land registration scheme is unlikely to 
command much popular support, and local level 
cooperation, if there is widespread distrust of 
government, and suspicion of corruption among 
officials administering it. Sporadic adjudication 
is particularly open to corruption.
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SCARCITY AMIDST PLENTY: THE 
ECONOMICS OF LAND TENURE IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Tim Curtin
Introduction
This paper examines the argument that 
Papua New Guinea’s system of traditional 
land tenure has not held back the country’s 
economic development and sets out the case for 
establishing individual land ownership in Papua 
New Guinea. Evidence is presented showing 
that output of those of PNG’s exported cash 
crops that are mainly produced by smallholders 
using communal land has not kept pace with 
population growth, and that production of food 
has at best grown no more rapidly than the 
population. The paper cites experience in other 
countries that indicates that land reform can 
be successful in raising productivity in the rural 
economy, and provides evidence indicating that 
tenure issues could explain the very low level 
of bank lending to agriculture in PNG. A 
concluding section makes some suggestions for 
how a land reform programme could be managed 
in Papua New Guinea in such a way as to win 
the support of most of the country’s people. 
Land ownership in Papua New Guinea
Almost all Papua New Guineans claim to 
be landowners, and indeed they are, but only 
collectively, since they may not as individuals 
freely buy, sell or otherwise dispose of their 
land. There is a clear difference, all too often 
overlooked by some anthropologists, between 
buying, owning, and, when one chooses, selling 
a car, without reference to third parties, and 
“owning” land that one has not bought and may 
not sell. There is no doubt that landowners in 
PNG do have some of the rights of ownership, 
extending to entitlements to build homes and 
to make use of the output from identified trees 
and gardens, but those rights generally do not 
include disposal of existing, or purchase of new, 
trees and gardens. Moreover while registration of 
customary land holdings would be a step forward 
this would not of itself create individual tenure, 
by which in this paper is meant the right to buy 
and sell land like any other commodity.
Harding (cited in Hogbin 1973: 107) spells 
it out: 
(individual land ownership) confers a 
number of definite rights: principally the 
right to use the land, the right to exclude 
others from its use and enjoyment; the 
right to transfer it by sale, lease, or 
gift; and, perhaps most notably the right 
to receive income from the property 
independent of use. This particular 
combination of rights – use, exclusion, 
alienation, and income – does not occur 
in any Papua New Guinea society.
The ‘Anthropologetics’ of Communal Land 
Tenure
Some – but by no means all – 
anthropologists and other social scientists are 
staunch defenders of the belief that communal 
land tenure is compatible with economic 
development. Thus although it is true that at 
most only some 3% of PNG’s land area has been 
alienated from customary owners to the State, 
from which individual leasehold titles may be 
purchased, it by no means follows that “the 
unequivocal corollary of this is that some 
97% of the land area and resources are 
currently held in private hands (sic)” (my 
italics), (Holzknecht 1999:141). This failure 
to distinguish between usufruct rights, whereby 
land owned communally may well be worked 
by individuals who retain the benefits of 
that work for their own purposes, and full 
ownership rights, is clear from Holzknecht’s 
further comment that in a traditional land 
tenure system “development of any kind cannot 
proceed without the explicit approval of the 
customary owners … through decisions made by 
customary corporate groups”. That requirement 
to obtain collective consent to any development 
from groups, rather than from private individuals 
acting independently of each other, conflicts with 
two of the four criteria laid down by Harding 
(exclusion and alienation) and they form the 
crux of the land issue in Papua New Guinea. 
Attempts by the Government, with World 
Bank encouragement, to move towards a system 
of individual land tenure culminated in the 
student-led riots in Port Moresby in 1995 
and 2001. The rioters apparently believed that 
the introduction of land registration would 
inevitably lead to landlessness, either through 
nationalisation of land by the government, 
or even through transfer to foreign ownership 
(Lea 1997; Lea 2001:49). In reality the 
proposals under discussion (Henao 2001) did 
not contemplate more than widening the scope 
for leasehold arrangements for land that would 
remain under customary tenure.
Ironically, in 2000 every single Papua New 
Guinean man, woman, and child could have 
been allocated title to over 8 hectares, for Papua 
New Guinea has a land area of over 452,000 
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islands, where there is access to alienated 
land, mostly on former copra plantations. Self-
evidently, PNG’s southern coastline provides 
little access to the credit secured against 
title that is usually necessary to develop the 
infrastructure for tourism.
The lack of development of PNG’s tourist 
potential, which is as great in the highlands 
as along the coastline, results in total annual 
inflows of foreign visitors (including business 
visitors) of less than 40,000, compared with 
Kenya’s 500,000 or Australia’s 2.5 million. 
Tourist resorts are labour intensive, create 
markets for local farm produce, and provide 
income opportunities for cultural groups.
Moreover if land ownership were clearly 
demarcated, it would greatly facilitate both the 
development of PNG’s still largely untapped 
mineral resources and the more equitable 
distribution of the royalties and compensation 
payments required of the developers. Disputes 
between putative landowners – many of whom 
have been as at Porgera and Mount Kare new 
arrivals in project areas whose claims could 
not easily be contested by residents who had 
no evidence to support their own claims – 
helped to delay some projects (e.g. the Gobe 
and Moran oilfields) and prevent others (Mount 
Kare goldfield) (Filer 1997; Ballard 1997:55).
Holzknecht (1999: 144) excuses the student-
led opposition to land reform by contending that 
“it cannot be overemphasized how important 
land is for individual and group identity, 
survival, continuity, security, and well-being 
in PNG: to be landless is to be a person 
without roots, without merit, unpredictable, and 
undependable, a tripman” (Pidgin for a drifter). 
Yet whatever the psychic and cultural benefits 
Papua New Guineans derive from their land, 
there is no doubt that the income it yields them 
under present arrangements is not impressive 
and is indeed falling, certainly in terms of 
cash incomes from crops like copra, cocoa and 
coffee, and quite possibly also in terms of food 
consumption per head. 
Agricultural Performance of Customary 
Landowners in Papua New Guinea
The data on population growth and growth 
of the main exported cash crops since 1980 in 
Fig.1A show how output of coffee, cocoa, and 
copra oil has fallen behind population growth in 
Papua New Guinea – the population increased 
by over 70% between 1980 and 2000, at an 
annual rate of 2.7%, and output of these crops 
in 2000 was higher than in 1980 by 31%, 32%, 
and 41% respectively, with annual growth rates 
sq. kilometres, not to mention its very large 
oceanic area between and beyond its hundreds 
of islands, and a population in 2000 of just 
over 5.2 million. This implies a crude population 
density of about 11 persons per sq.km. (i.e. per 
100 hectares), up from 6.5 in 1980, but still 
very low compared with Indonesia’s 114, if not 
with Australia’s 2. To be sure, much of PNG’s 
terrain is mountainous and some coastal areas 
of the mainland are swampy, but compared 
with say Afghanistan, with its 27 million 
people in 640,000 sq.km. of equally rugged 
but arid mountains (a density of 40 per 100 
hectares, i.e. 2.5 hectares per person), PNG’s 
land endowment cannot be considered either 
small or ill favoured. Indeed, with the average 
family household comprising 5-6 persons, the 
land availability per household is about 45-50 
hectares, almost all of it well wooded, with large 
potential for expansion of tree crop production, 
many unexploited arable areas that are also 
suitable for intensive livestock production, and 
all generally within relatively short distances 
of clean running water, although that becomes 
problematic in (the relatively infrequent) 
drought years.1 
Yet despite the evident plentiful availability 
of land per se, almost none of it is available 
for purchase for agricultural, commercial, or 
residential purposes, and there is as a result 
a serious shortage of land (Ploeg 1999). One 
potent sign of PNG’s land scarcity is the 
extraordinary absence in the whole country – 
apart from the 3% of State land – of both 
modern housing, except in the towns, and of 
large-scale agricultural and tree-crop plantations 
except in the alienated State-owned areas. The 
lack of availability of land for development also 
partly explains the absence of tourist resorts 
along nearly the whole length of the country’s 
coastline. 
The low levels of mortgage financing for 
homes in PNG are discussed below. In the case 
of tourism, while PNG’s long southern coastlines 
face part of the Great Barrier Reef, and 
other similar reefs with world-renowned diving 
possibilities, there is but a single tourist resort 
(Loloata Island) that exploits this resource, in 
contrast to both the hundreds on the other side 
of the reef in northern Queensland and to the 
dozen tourist resorts that have been developed 
on PNG’s northern coast and the New Guinea 
1 Increasing population pressure in some parts of the 
country, especially the Eastern Highlands province, has led 
to degradation or riverine water supply, and typhoid has 
become a serious health problem.
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of less than 2%. The fall in the Kina since 
1994 has exaggerated the money value of the 
exports of these crops and thereby concealed the 
extent of the fall in the real value of output per 
head implied by the comparative growth rates 
displayed in Fig.1A. 
The minimal growth since 1980 of 
production of coffee, cocoa and copra (and 
others like pyrethrum and rubber) contrasts 
with the belief that since most of the total 
output of these crops derives from smallholders 
working on customary land, “customary tenure 
systems are not an impediment to economic 
development” (Holzknecht 1999: 156). 
However in his contribution to this discussion 
paper, Holzknecht accepts that despite PNG’s 
“tremendous potential to harness the benefits 
of a resilient civil society with strong social 
capital… there is significant underdevelopment; 
a very large proportion of PNG’s rural 
population do not have access to basic services. 
They live in situations of great economic and 
social hardship, and … suffer from a great 
poverty of opportunity … to such an extent that 
life in many villages is now worse than it was 10 
or even 20 or more years ago”.
That is certainly not the case in and 
around the great oil palm plantations in New 
Ireland, West New Britain, Milne Bay, and Oro 
Provinces. The casual visitor to these can hardly 
fail to be impressed by the evident prosperity 
of the neighbouring villages, based not only on 
supply of labour to the estates, although much 
of that tends to be from other parts of the 
country/province, but on their own production 
of oil palm and on the general economic activity 
and social services (like clinics and schools) 
underpinned by the estates. 
It is also suggestive that oil palm is the only 
tree crop to have increased output consistently 
faster than the population growth rate (Fig.1B). 
But two-thirds of PNG’s palm oil is grown by 
foreign companies (three British, one Malaysian, 
one Belgian) on alienated land, and the balance 
by smallholders – and many of these, notably 
in West New Britain, also own their land as 
individual block holders. There are some small-
scale outgrowers working customary land and 
supplying fresh fruit bunches to the estates’ mills 
in Milne Bay, Oro, West New Britain, and New 
Ireland, but they depend heavily on the estates 
for a range of services as well as access to the 
mills, which are of course all on alienated land, 
and their productivity even so falls well short of 
the nucleus estates’, by as much as four times 
in the case of Milne Bay (Koczberski et al. 
2002: 21). The five estates mostly occupy land 
alienated for copra or cocoa estates during the 
German colonial period, i.e. pre-1914. 
Believers in the development potential of 
customary land have yet to explain why there 
has been no attempt by its “owners” to organise 
Fig. 1A
Indices of Agricultural Exports and Population Growth
Papua New Guinea 1980–2000
Cocoa, Coffee, Copra Oil
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1998, 2001.
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palm oil production in other feasible areas (e.g. 
East New Britain, East Sepik and Madang). 
They could build their own milling facilities, 
perhaps using the legislation for establishing 
Incorporated Land Groups (“ILG”) that have 
been proposed as an alternative to land 
alienation, to raise finance, but as explained 
by Lea (2001), such groups may fare no better 
than individuals offering only their customary 
land rights as collateral to banks (see below). 
Moreover Henao (2001) has documented how 
all too often as many as five ILGs have laid 
claim to the same land.
 Similarly, PNG’s landowners have failed to 
develop their livestock resources to their full 
potential. Hide (2002:19,84) has documented 
the low productivity of the country’s pig 
industry, citing Gibson and Rozelle (1998:19) 
who estimated a rural production figure of 
60,000 tonnes a year in 1996, from a total 
stock of about 1.8 million animals, valued at 
K243 million. This does not compare well with 
Australia’s annual output of 370,000 tonnes p.a. 
from a total stock of 2.6 million animals in 1999 
valued at K1.4 billion Kina (ABS 2001: 641-3). 
Logging is the only other of PNG’s primary 
industries to have grown more rapidly than the 
population (Fig.1B), and then only until 1996. 
Since the World Bank obliged the government 
to impose penal taxation on log exports in 1996, 
logging exports have also fallen like exports of 
all other crops apart from palm oil (Hunt 2002). 
As with oil palm, it is foreign companies, 
mostly Japanese and Malaysian, which play the 
leading role. These companies operate under 
licenses issued by the Government, nominally 
with the approval of, or in association with, 
local “landowners”. The licenses are a form of 
lease, but do not constitute transfer of ownership 
of the logging areas, and that in itself is enough 
to inhibit the loggers from replanting trees 
whose useful life would only emerge after their 
licenses expired. 
Various reports have revealed the extent of 
malpractice in the logging industry, beginning 
with the bribing of successive Ministers for 
Forestry and their departmental heads to 
secure licenses, through breaches of permit 
conditions and transfer pricing to avoid PNG 
taxes, to exceeding sustainable cuts, and 
“persistent manipulation of resource owners 
(sic)” (Holzknecht 1999:147). The history of 
logging in PNG is indeed one of failure by the 
putative owners of the resource to establish their 
rights and secure an equitable distribution of the 
industry’s profits, because of their inability to 
prove their title to any given area (Filer 1997).
In short, the problem has been that the 
“resource owners” have had no proof of their 
own ownership rights, so that the logging 
companies were free to treat with a range of 
so-called landowner companies that had no 
legal title but represented themselves as the 
“resource owners”, when in reality they were 
no more than the satraps of local politicians: 
“agreements about access to resources were made 
behind closed doors, with very little if any 
broad consultation with the majority of resource 
Fig. 1B
Palm Oil, Logs
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1998, 2001.
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owners, (and the landowner companies) 
inevitably side with the loggers against their 
own people” (Holzknecht 1997b:98; 1999:149). 
As a result the royalties and other devolved 
benefits due from the licensees do not reach the 
customary residents of the affected areas who are 
the putative “landowners”.
Another indicator of the poor development 
outcomes in PNG’s logging industry is a 
tendency for population growth to be slower in 
the main logging areas than it is in the census 
districts where mines or oil palm estates operate 
on alienated land. Western Province is a case 
in point, with the fastest population growth in 
the North Fly district that hosts the Ok Tedi 
mine, and the slowest in the Middle and South 
Fly Districts where the loggers have moved 
in. Similarly in West Sepik, where the only 
significant commercial activity is a large logging 
project, population growth since 1980 is well 
below the national average (NSO, 2002). In 
the absence of title or long-term leases, loggers 
there have had little incentive to replant 
logged-out areas with the plantation timber 
that is necessary to sustain the large-scale 
capital investment needed to establish a timber 
processing industry with its significant labour 
requirements. By contrast PNG’s only – until 
recently – plantation and timber processing 
industry, in Bulolo, largely accounts for the 
growing density of population in the Wau-
Bulolo valley.
Food Production of Communal Landowners in 
Papua New Guinea
Communal landowners’ food production is 
even less impressive than their cash crops. 
In the total absence of food exports (itself 
telling, given PNG’s volcanic soils and excellent 
rainfall, vastly superior on both counts to 
Australia’s), there is very little hard data, and 
almost none at all in the form of time series. 
There are a few snapshots: the Provincial 
Working Papers on Agricultural Systems of 
Papua New Guinea, like that by Hide et al. 
for the Western Highlands Province (1995), 
includes data on food consumption of farmers 
working with various crop systems in 1983. 
Gibson and Rozelle (1998) report on a later 
national poverty assessment. The conference 
volume Food Security for Papua New Guinea 
(Bourke et al., 2001) contains a number of 
papers with other “snapshots”. The country’s 
large agricultural potential has been documented 
by Hanson et al. (2001).
The limitations of subsistence food 
production are illustrated by a Western 
Highlands survey: some hundreds of families in 
each district were asked in 1982/3 what they 
had eaten the previous day: in a typical district 
97% reported eating sweet potato, 15% banana, 
5% taro, 2% cassava, 2% fish, and 24% ate rice 
(Hide et al., 1995: 25). All except the rice was 
grown locally. Apparently no meats or poultry 
were consumed, and apart from pork, reserved 
for special feasts, virtually none is produced. 
Duncan and Temu suggested (1995: 37) 
that the value of subsistence production in 
the national accounts is under-estimated, for 
example, at only K396 million in 1989, and 
that it is likely to contribute more than half of 
agriculture’s share of GDP. Gibson and Rozelle 
confirm this view by indicating a value of total 
rural household food production of K1.3 billion 
in 1995 (1998: 19). But that apparently large 
amount reduces to only K362 per person of 
PNG’s rural population in 1995, i.e. less than 
one Kina per person per day (equal to US$0.70 
in 1995, and less than the US$1.00 per person 
per day considered by the World Bank to be the 
bare minimum for survival). 
It should however be noted that such per 
capita data, which averages total production 
over the rural population as a whole, conceals 
considerable variations. Compensation paid to 
some of the landowners in the Porgera Valley 
by the mining company varied from K15,000 
per hectare for unimproved bush to K35,000 
per hectare for land under active cultivation 
with many improvements, at a time when the 
Kina was nominally worth slightly more than 
US$1.00 (Burton 1997: 123). The latter figure 
implies an annual income of around K3,500 
per hectare – but confirms Hernando de Soto’s 
vision (1999) of the underlying but unrealized 
wealth of the poor in developing countries 
like PNG. With security of K35,000, a titled 
landowner could expect to borrow as much as 
K100,000 if he or she envisaged projects (e.g. 
housing for rental to Porgera’s mineworkers, 
pumps, fencing, purchase of stock) yielding 
enough to service that debt – see below for a 
discussion of the low level of bank lending for 
agriculture in PNG.
Part of the explanation for the minimal 
growth of the smallholder cash crop sector may 
be that it has switched much of its effort from 
non-food cash crops to food production for 
the growing population. Data to document any 
such trend, if it exists, is not available, other 
than the evidence in the 1996 Household 
Survey of insufficient food production to provide 
an adequate intake of calories by the rural 
population, with 42% of the rural population 
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receiving less than 2000 calories per day 
(Gibson 2001:409). In addition there are 
seasonal deficiencies, like those reported in the 
Eastern Highlands by Muntwiler and Shelton 
(2001:439). Gibson also noted that “the risk of 
child stunting and chronic energy deficiencies 
for mothers” was twice as high in the rural 
areas as in the towns, and Mueller (2001:428) 
reported how satisfactory child growth was 
critically correlated with household cash crop 
production, and in that context the failure of 
the output of crops like cocoa and coffee to keep 
pace with population growth is alarming.
Thus the demonstrable poor performance 
of PNG’s smallholder cash crop producers has 
considerable implications for the future standard 
of living of the mass of the population, with, 
as noted above, output below the population 
growth rate of 2.7% p.a. The Government’s 
response in the 2002 Budget is to allocate 
additional funding of K30 million for the coffee 
and copra industries, but if that funding is 
merely provided to the industry boards, both 
notorious for misappropriation of growers’ funds, 
it is unlikely to achieve much. 
It has been argued that the existence of 
food production on customary land is enough 
“to refute economists’ claims that customary 
land tenure can be seen only as a severe 
impediment to development activities” because 
of the “extremely high value” of food production 
supplied to urban markets and of cash crops 
like betelnut (Holzknecht 1999:146). But the 
only specific data mentioned are an estimate 
of the gross value of betelnut production of 
about US$4.5 million in 1995 (then about 
K6.4 million) in Central, Morobe, and East 
New Britain provinces (the main producers). 
This is an important and valuable crop for the 
communities concerned, but after adjusting for 
costs, the net income from betelnut translates 
to a per person figure in those provinces’ total 
population of not more than K3-5 per year. The 
claimed “extremely high value” of rural food 
production was estimated by Gibson at only 
K1.3 billion in 1995, or less than one Kina 
per head per year of the total rural population. 
Thus in reality the available evidence provides 
scant support for the view that customary tenure 
has not prevented development of the rural 
economy.
It was noted above that PNG’s customary 
landowners have failed to respond to 
opportunities for growing the world’s most 
profitable food crop, palm oil, except where they 
live in proximity to a foreign estate and mill. 
Another possibility for these landowners is the 
large potential for both red and white meat 
production. PNG’s annual consumption of red 
meat (beef, sheep, and goat) has trebled over 
the last twenty years, growing at 6% p.a., to 
about 52,000 tonnes of cwe (carcass weight 
equivalent), but almost the whole increase 
has had to be met by imports, amounting to 
41,800 tonnes in 1998. Domestic production 
is dominated by commercial producers on 
alienated land, such as Ramu Sugar. “Expansion 
of red meat production would lessen import 
requirements and save foreign exchange” 
(Vincent and Low 2000) – as well as 
providing gross income of K130 million (the 
value of imports in 1998), an amount double 
the estimated value of commercial betelnut 
production noted above. 
Red meat demand is mostly for sheep meat, 
but PNG is not well suited for sheep, despite 
attempts in the Eastern Highlands. Suitable 
areas of grassland exist to allow for much larger 
production of beef, but this requires bigger 
holdings than most smallholders have access 
to, and clear property rights over herds. Goats, 
well suited for smallholder production, are a 
possibility but have not been widely adopted. 
PNG has maintained self-sufficiency in pork 
production – but has evidently failed to develop 
commercial production sufficiently to compete 
with imported beef for a bigger share of the total 
increase in meat consumption. For as shown in 
Table 1, pig meat’s share of total estimated meat 
consumption in PNG has fallen from 53% in 
1980 to 20% in 1998. The Table indicates the 
failure of PNG smallholders to respond to the 
significant opportunities for commercial sales 
from their main livestock resource.
Table 1 Meat Consumption in 
Papua New Guinea 1980–1998
Percentages 1980 1990 1998
Beef   17.77 17.67 15.44
Sheep meat 6.73 32.94 34.47
Poultry meat 22.76 26.25 30.46
Pig meat 52.74 23.14 19.63
Total  100 100 100
Total –  70,632 87,148 104,985
in tonnes 
of cwe
Source: Vincent and Low (2000).
Note: Domestic production accounts for about 15-18% of 
beef consumption; while almost all sheep meat is imported; 
all goat meat consumption is locally produced; PNG is self-
sufficient in poultry, which was protected first by an import 
ban and then by prohibitive tariffs, and in pig meat. There 
are no estimates for production of sheep, goat, poultry, and 
pig meat for own (i.e. subsistence) consumption since 1980. 
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
12
Anton Ploeg offers rather different 
arguments against the hypothesis that “the 
continued existence of customary land tenure, in 
other words the lack of registered land rights, 
especially individual ownership and leasehold, 
is a main factor hampering growth” (1999:165, 
178). First he notes that the adoption of cash 
cropping by PNG’s subsistence farmers did not 
lead to any significant change in techniques, 
apart from the adoption of steel tools in 
place of tools made from sticks and stones, 
which continued to be based on manual 
labour and employed little capital: “accordingly 
labour productivity is restricted [and] production 
requires relatively much time which limits the 
expansion of cash cropping”. However this 
lack of adoption of labour saving equipment 
of all kinds, of which water pumps are an 
obvious example, that would be the norm in 
say Queensland or even any Australian suburban 
garden, is itself as much a symptom of the 
land tenure regime as an explanation for the 
continuing low productivity of PNG agriculture.
Secondly, Ploeg notes that the amount 
of land where individuals can have secure 
customary rights within their existing villages is 
limited, because land is parcelled out in small 
lots, and new lots can only be acquired at some 
distance from existing settlements, adding to 
walking time between plots. Claims on such 
new areas may be contested and lead to 
disputes, which explains the prevalence of 
unused land through much of PNG’s rural areas. 
Moreover since inheritance systems exclude 
primogeniture, there is a tendency towards 
fragmentation of existing household plots. 
When even some households’ larger aggregate 
holdings comprise many small and scattered 
plots, the scope for economies of scale with 
equipment of any kind becomes limited.
Thirdly, Ploeg emphasizes the continuing 
importance of ceremonial activities, which pre-
empt not only labour time but also any 
cash derived from crops. This militates against 
accumulation of savings for the purposes of 
investment in lieu of consumption.
Clearly Ploeg (1999:181) is right that it is far 
from certain that changing land tenure would be 
enough to create the conditions for increasing 
output and productivity in PNG’s rural sector. 
Yet experience elsewhere, starting with Europe, 
but including African countries like Egypt (since 
1952) and Kenya (since 1955), suggests that 
such pessimism may be unwarranted.
Impact of Land Reform
It has been suggested that PNG’s forests are 
like “the commons”, i.e. the land that in Europe 
was not enclosed and transferred to private 
ownership until the second half of the last 
millennium, and so was in principle available 
to all for grazing and other purposes, leading 
to degradation and far lower productivity than 
was achieved after enclosure and alienation. 
The phenomenon known as ‘the tragedy of the 
commons’ arises when the users of common 
land for grazing (or in PNG’s case, for logging) 
have every incentive to maximize their own 
utilization of the resource since they need 
contribute nothing to the costs of maintaining 
it, the end result being its ruination (Jones and 
McGavin 2000:28).
The role of the enclosures in raising 
agricultural productivity in Europe has been 
discounted, with claims that in England 
enclosures resulted only “in a flood of landless 
people into urban areas, thus providing cheap 
labour to fuel the industrial revolution” (e.g. 
Holzknecht 1999:154). This stereotype of the 
enclosure movement is far removed from 
reality, and ignores the huge increase in 
agricultural productivity, whilst “the flood of 
landless people” arose from the reductions in 
infant mortality in families settled on enclosed 
land, which in conjunction with primogeniture 
inheritance that meant younger sons had not 
much to hope for if they stayed at home 
(Armstrong 1989:657). 
Kenya’s land registration and titling 
programme was the inspiration behind the 
Australian government’s belated and unavailing 
attempts to promote land tenure reform in PNG 
in the years shortly before independence was 
granted in 1975 (Rowton Simpson et al., 
1971). Prior to 1955 land tenure in Kenya 
had much in common with customary systems 
in PNG. Thereafter the colonial government 
combined a programme of land registration and 
consolidation in the customary land areas with 
resettlement of African farmers on former white-
owned farms, and this was continued at an 
accelerated rate by Jomo Kenyatta’s government 
(1964-1977) (Hazlewood 1979; see below). 
The outcome was an explosion of production 
of both old and new crops by Kenya’s 
formerly purely PNG-type subsistence farmers. 
Particularly striking was the emergence of small-
scale dairy farming in the newly tenured areas, 
with enough milk produced to support the 
government’s free school milk programme in 
the country’s cities by the late 1970s, but 
this has received less attention than the large 
increases in Kenya’s smallholders’ production 
of coffee and tea. A key factor was the large 
provision of credit that became possible with 
the establishment of title (Okoth-Ogendo 1981: 
  Land Registration in Papua New Guinea: Competing Perspectives
13
333-337). The data in Table 2 on production 
of coffee and tea in Kenya in the 1970s shows 
how smallholders accounted for a rising share 
of the rapid growth of coffee production in 
Kenya between 1964 and 1976. Smallholders 
dominated PNG’s coffee production by 1975, 
when they accounted for two-thirds of total 
production, but expansion since then has been 
slow, as implied by Fig.1A (Fleming and 
Anthony, 1993:52).
It would be wrong to imply that changing 
land tenure changed everything in Kenya, 
least of all the propensity to governmental 
corruption, as endemic there as in PNG. 
One of the emerging problems from the 
1980s onwards was that unreformed inheritance 
laws led in practice to breaking up of the 
titled smallholdings to accommodate burgeoning 
numbers of inheritors. 
Nevertheless Kenya’s agricultural production 
contrasts vividly with PNG’s. In 1980 its food 
imports were 8% of total imports, while PNG’s 
were 21%. Kenya’s food and beverage exports 
were 44% of its total exports in 1980, and 59% 
in 1998 (latest available year); PNG’s were 23% 
in 1980 and 23% in 1999 (dropping back from 
27% in 1998 after the recovery in oil prices in 
1999) (World Bank 1987, 2000; BPNG 2001).
Egypt’s land reform from 1952 involved 
breaking up large estates and providing hitherto 
landless peasants (“fellah”), who had previously 
in the main been tenant farmers, with title 
to their new holdings (Mabro 1974:56-63). 
Egypt’s land reforms in the sense of moving 
to individual tenure had begun in the previous 
century, and the 1952 land redistribution 
was firmly based on individual title. It was 
accompanied by a large increase in the provision 
of rural credit and the development of a 
cooperative movement, essential when 90% of 
holdings consisted of one hectare or less. The 
outcome was dramatic increases in agricultural 
productivity, despite the fall in yields that might 
have been expected from the additional annual 
cropping permitted by the Aswan High Dam, 
with yields per hectare of most crops rising by 
at least 50% between 1951 and 1971 (Mabro 
1974: 81). Above all Egypt demonstrates that 
individual land tenure is compatible with 
maintaining equity, by the use of legislation 
limiting the maximum size of holdings, contrary 
to common suggestions that customary tenure 
equals equity and that individual tenure equals 
monopolization of all land by a few.
Establishing a fully juridical system of 
land tenure in PNG, with enforcement of 
repossessions in case of mortgage defaults, 
would in all likelihood greatly increase banks’ 
willingness to lend, and development of 
cooperatives would also be helpful (they played 
a leading role in Kenya’s smallholder coffee 
sector – and in Tanzania’s until abolished by 
Julius Nyerere in the 1970s). By contrast, some 
of PNG’s commodity boards (cocoa, copra) 
have in some cases served only to expropriate 
growers’ surpluses in times of high prices, and 
Table 2 Production of coffee and tea, Kenya and Papua New Guinea
  KENYA    PNG 
 ‘000 coffee  tea  coffee tea
 tonnes s/holders total s/holders total total total
 1964 16.6 41.5    
 1970 30.4 58.5    
 1972 27.8 61.8 11.2 53.3  
 1974 39.3 70.2 14.4 53.4  
 1976 37.7 80.2 19.2 62.0 48.1 5.6
 1978 N/A 95.0 N/A 87.0 45.8 7.0
 1980     51.0 7.9
 1985     40.6 6.6
 1990     63.3 5.4
 1995     55.1 4.2
 2000     66.6 8.5
Sources: Hazlewood 1979; BPNG 1998, 2001
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have at best been more concerned with price 
stabilization than with expanding their clients’ 
production (Fleming 2001).
Agricultural Credit in Papua New Guinea
The lack of credit and other support services 
necessary for raising PNG’s rural productivity 
has been widely noted. The Government for 
many years provided substantial budgetary funds 
to the so-called Rural Development Bank (the 
former “Agbank”) for on-lending to the rural 
sector. The Bank accepted no deposits, and 
soon became known for being unconcerned with 
repayment or payment of interest, with the 
result that almost its total portfolio was non-
performing by the time it was taken over by the 
state-owned commercial bank PNGBC in 1999. 
The lack of repayment of its loans for agriculture 
meant that it was always wholly dependent on 
budget funding for new loans.
Otherwise credit for the rural sector has 
depended on the commercial banking system, 
and as is evident from Table 3, that lending, 
at less than K200 million in 2000 and 2001, is a 
small proportion of total bank advances in PNG, 
and certainly out of line with the size of the 
rural sector with its 80% of the country’s total 
population. Bank lending to the agricultural 
sector has declined from K350 million in 1994 
to K165 million in 2001, despite the increase in 
total lending over that period from K1.16 billion 
to K1.75 billion (see Table 3). Thus just as land 
is scarce in PNG, despite its abundance, there is 
also a scarcity of money for agriculture, but that 
is more apparent than real, given the banking 
system’s large unutilized lending capacity. 
PNG’s banks in September 2001 had liquid 
assets equal to 37% of their lending, well above 
PNG’s very high legal minimum of 30% – 
the norm in developed countries is around 8% 
(BPNG, 2001). Were collateral available, the 
banks would no doubt lend more for agriculture 
– and the BPNG might well then be able 
to lower the liquidity ratio, since unlike most 
of the banks’ lending, which is taken up by 
importers, loans to the rural sector would relieve 
the country’s balance of payment restraint, by 
reducing food imports and raising exports.
Mortgage Lending in Papua New Guinea
The lack of collateral does not only hold 
back PNG’s agriculture sector. Bank lending for 
housing is less than K100 million, around 7% 
of total bank lending, compared with nearly 
50% in Australia. Introducing individual land 
tenure could quite quickly lead to modern home 
construction not only in the burgeoning squatter 
settlements in PNG’s towns but also in its many 
villages, led initially perhaps by retirees from the 
urban areas. That in turn would stimulate the 
construction industry, which at present accounts 
for only around 3% of GDP, and which is both 
labour intensive and relatively reliant on local 
materials.
Table 3 Commercial Banks Outstanding Advances by Sector 1994-2001
 Agiculture Manufacturing Commerce Construction Housing Other Total  
       
1994 519.1 90.5 317.7 59.8 65.2 667.0 2545.9
A$M    
1994 350.5 61.1 214.5 40.4 44.0 450.4 1160.9
1995 321.4 68.5 217.7 44.2 49.8 539.8 1241.4
1996 286.8 73.5 226.9 31.1 46.7 517.1 1182.1
1997 294.3 70.5 245.1 32.2 49.3 599.8 1291.2
1998 248.0 95.4 285.4 51.7 78.0 932.7 1691.2
1999 180.5 67.5 363.8 62.8 83.6 961.2 1719.4
2000 141.0 71.9 386.2 58.2 96.2 1059.8 1813.3
2001 164.8 91.8 409.1 61.5 95.5 930.2 1752.9
2001 102.14 56.9 253.6 38.12 59.2 576.5 1086.5
A$M 
Source: BPNG (Quarterly Economic Bulletin)
Note: Data is for March, usually the month when seasonal loans to agriculture are at their peak.  Other mostly comprises loans 
to other businesses, the government, and non-housing loans to individuals
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liability of its members as primarily owners of 
ground rents, whilst encompassing the possibility 
of losing its leaseholder rights over their land, 
could approximate modern corporations. This 
was indeed broadly the concept behind the 
tentative proposals for land reform, put forward 
on behalf of the Minister for Lands by Henao 
(2001), which led to the student riots on the 
streets of Port Moresby in July 2001.
 A guide to implementing land reform in Papua 
New Guinea
Siaguru (2001) has well described the 
practical difficulties that would confront any 
new attempt to implement land tenure reform in 
PNG, in a dialogue with a friend of his whose 
comments are given here in italics:
There is no way that a registration of PNG 
customary land could be drawn up this century. 
Even if, in the odd case you could manage to come 
to a decision about a specific piece of land, do you 
imagine there would be no appeals? Bear in mind 
what is needed to codify the land. You have to 
establish what the unit of land-ownership is in the 
first place. Or rather, that’s not the first place. First 
you have to determine what types of land rights there 
are, then establish the owning unit for each category. 
And, of course, both the types of rights and the 
owning units are likely to vary from one part of the 
country to another. But that’s not the difficult part. 
Having set up the types of rights and the types 
of owning units, you then have to draw on the 
ground the boundaries of the extent of these rights 
on the lands concerned, and you have to draw up 
a list of the names, the identities, of the actual 
owning groups. And, then, once you have got 
that accomplished, you have to establish who are 
those persons who are rightfully members of all 
those different groups. Have you never come across 
instances in which royalties from some commercial 
exploitation of this or that local exploitable resource 
continue to lie in a bank deposit because the clans 
involved are so stubborn about what they consider is 
the correct division of ownership, and so proceeds, 
that they prefer seeing the cash left unused in 
the bank rather than entertain the idea that their 
neighbours might be illicitly benefiting from more 
than their rightful share? No, Tony, there is no way 
that a registration of PNG customary land could be 
drawn up this century. And, then, by the end of 
the century, there will be so many of us, given the 
current rate of population increase, that we would 
not be able to sell the land even should its boundaries 
be all neatly drawn and everyone with a claim given 
his or her certificate, because any one share would 
be only worthwhile investing on the horses, and 
anyway we’ll all be cultivating everything in sight 
with not a tree to be seen.
The German development agency GTZ has 
acted on de Soto’s ideas (2000) by sponsoring 
large-scale registration of illegally built homes 
in the largest slum in the world’s most crowded 
city, Egypt’s Cairo, as a first step towards 
upgrading both housing and infrastructure. The 
residents of Ezbet Bakhit will be able to buy 
the land they occupy, and thereby gain access to 
credit, as well as start paying taxes (Drummond 
2001).
David Lea (2001: 39) has discussed the 
structure of the 1974 Land Groups 
Incorporation Act, the enabling legislation for 
the ILGs advocated by Holzknecht (1997a) as 
an alternative to individual land tenure for 
purposes of raising capital. Lea quotes James’ 
description of the Act as “lineage clothed with 
legal personality” and retaining key elements of 
the customary land system, such as “collective 
ownership, mass participation in the decision 
making processes, traditional disputes settlement 
philosophy, and a distribution system based on 
one’s interest in the land” (1985: 50). That 
description almost fits a modern company or 
corporation, with its collective ownership by 
shareholders, their enfranchisement at annual 
meetings that appoint directors and determine 
profits distribution in proportion with one’s 
interest in the company. What the ILG lacks 
is the company’s liability to be bankrupted 
and lose its corporate assets (but not those 
of its shareholders) if it fails to manage them 
effectively. That penalty for failure provides 
the element of accountability or “contestability” 
that de Soto (2000: 47) has emphasized as 
crucial to the development process – and that 
was so signally lacking in the lending operations 
of the Rural Development Bank. 
The unwillingness of much of rural society to 
contemplate the possibility of mortgage sales of 
estates and farms that have failed to service their 
debts largely explains the decision of PNG’s 
banks to walk away from rural lending even to 
formerly colonial enterprises working alienated 
land that are now in national hands. The Wahgi 
Mek coffee estate was a rare success story of 
a landowner company able to raise large bank 
loans because it had title to a former colonial 
estate – but that success excited the envy of 
adjacent communal “landowners” lacking title 
to their own holdings who claimed possession of 
Wahgi Mek by force in 2000. Such actions both 
explain the reduction in lending to agriculture 
evident in Table 3 – and indicate the need 
for comprehensive rather than piecemeal land 
reform (see below). But clearly the ILG model, if 
adapted to accommodate the principle of limited 
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
16
It may therefore be helpful to describe how 
individual land tenure was achieved elsewhere, 
despite all the above problems, first in 1778 
in the present writer’s ancestral village of 
Wedmore, in Somerset, England, and secondly 
around 1960, in Kenya, where almost identical 
problems were successfully dealt with. The 
most important point is that contrary to the 
apparent belief of some of PNG’s opponents of 
land reform, in neither case was any person 
dispossessed of any part of his customary land, 
even if subsequently as a matter of choice the 
land awarded was sold or otherwise disposed of.
Thus in Wedmore in 1778, a large majority 
of the village’s customary landowners themselves 
applied to the Parliament in London for an Act 
enclosing Wedmore Moor, being the common 
land to the east of the village (its other 
surrounding moors were dealt with later).2 
The Act made a total of 258 awards of 
customary tenements within the Moor to some 
168 individuals (some obtained more than one 
allotment, in accordance with their acquired 
customary rights) (Rose 1982: 20-26). This 
writer’s distant relative William Stone was one 
of those “allotted and awarded” full title to his 
“tenement” (i.e. parcel of land to which he 
had customary rights), as defined by survey and 
measuring two acres (about 0.8 hectares). The 
Act also allotted several tenements of two acres 
each to William’s brother Benjamin, his cousin 
Gabriel, and his aunt Mary Stone. In return for 
granting them title, the Act required the Stones 
and the other recipients of awards to maintain 
and keep in repair “all gates, styles, hedges, 
mounds, bridges, fences and watercourses” on 
their land (Rose 1982: 72-74). No persons 
who had customary rights to any part of the 
Moor lost their entitlement, but they did gain 
the right to sell their – or buy other – 
allotments. The population of Wedmore at the 
1801 Census, by when the enclosure process 
had been completed, was 2,083; but contrary 
to Holzknecht’s assertion noted above that the 
enclosures led to a decrease in rural population, 
the village’s population had increased by the 
1851 census to 3,865 (Page et al., 1911: 341).
The creation of individual title in Kenya 
was similar. Again, not only were traditional 
rights recognized, but in addition opportunity 
was taken to consolidate scattered fragments of 
land holdings into larger single units, and this 
was widely welcomed (Sorrenson 1967: 223). 
Unlike England, where the enclosures took 
place gradually over centuries, the process in 
Kenya’s highlands was completed within two 
decades. By 1977 92% of 30 million hectares 
(equal to about 66% of PNG’s total area) of 
total registrable customary land (i.e. excluding 
the north-eastern nomadic areas) had been 
registered and title granted, amounting to some 
1.7 million farms, of which about half were less 
than one hectare (Hazlewood 1979: 34-42). As 
noted above, the 2000 Census indicated that 
PNG has about one million households, so that 
providing each of them with registered title 
would not be more difficult than in Kenya – 
and as in Kenya, aid donors could be asked to 
support the process with expertise and funding. 
A key feature of Kenya’s land reform, unlike 
England’s, is that it adopted South Australia’s 
Torrens system of 1858, whereby registration 
was compulsory and title was guaranteed by the 
State (Sorrenson 1967: 182-183). This was done 
to avoid the complexities of land conveyancing 
in England and use of the “corrupt” local courts 
in Kenya.
Table 2 above provided data on the Kenyan 
smallholder’s contribution to production of 
coffee and tea. In the case of tea, the area 
planted increased from 5,100 hectares in 1964 to 
43,600 hectares in 1976 (Hazlewood 1979: 45). 
In addition to tea and coffee, smallholders made 
a notable contribution to sugar production, 
accounting for a third of total production of 
1.9 million tonnes of sugar cane in 1977 
(Hazlewood 1979: 45). By contrast, although 
sugar cane is native to the country, smallholders 
scarcely contribute at all to PNG’s commercial 
sugar-cane production, which is confined to a 
single estate that produces less than a quarter of 
Kenya’s output.
Summary and Conclusions
Holzknecht and Ploeg amongst others argue 
that there is no economic necessity for PNG 
to change its traditional forms of land tenure 
to modern forms based on alienation, “and 
making land a commodity to be bought and 
sold” (Holzknecht 1999: 141), “because a high 
percentage of coffee, cocoa, copra exported from 
PNG comes from smallholders working on their 
customary land” (Holzknecht this volume). The 
failure shown above of those smallholders to 
expand output in line with the growth of 
population is nevertheless prima facie evidence 
of a case for land reform, evidence that 
is supported by Holzknecht’s assessment that 
“some 93% of the poor live in rural areas, where 
over 41% of the population live below the 
poverty line”. Holzknecht’s further comments 
2 It was generally necessary that at least three-quarters of the 
customary landowners should support the bill.
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that “large [sic] tonnages of garden greens 
and other vegetables – and certainly not 
all traditional crops – are sold in markets 
around the country”, and that “the betelnut 
market around PNG is likely the highest value 
annual crop for which a sophisticated marketing 
network across PNG has been developed” 
were shown above to be based on inadequate 
interpretation of the data, as well as being 
inconsistent with recognition of the depth of 
poverty in PNG’s rural areas.
The experiences noted above of land reform 
in countries as diverse as England, Egypt, and 
Kenya suggest the potential benefits available 
in PNG. In particular, the expansion of 
Kenya’s smallholder production of coffee and 
tea if replicated in PNG could well have 
more than doubled the cash incomes of the 
latter’s smallholders in its highlands. The 
similar apparent inability of PNG’s customary 
landowners to respond to the opportunities for 
cash production of palm oil, sugar cane, and red 
and white meats also suggests that the problem 
may lie in land tenure.
Land reform of itself cannot solve all the 
problems of development, but it has been part 
and parcel of success in so many countries in the 
rest of the world that it deserves a chance in 
Papua New Guinea.
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CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
SYSTEMS: RESILIENT, APPROPRIATE 
AND PRODUCTIVE
Hartmut Holzknecht
Introduction
Customary land tenure issues in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) were most recently brought to 
national and international attention through a 
series of violent marches and demonstrations 
during July 2001. Demonstrators’ anger was 
directed in particular against globalisation, 
against the World Bank and the IMF and 
at their assumed coordinated efforts directed 
towards land mobilisation and registration of 
customary land in the country.
In mid-1995, almost to the day, there 
were similar violent demonstrations in many of 
PNG’s urban centres in response to virtually 
the same range of issues. At that time these 
public responses were directed in particular 
at one component of a World Bank-funded 
‘Land Mobilisation Project’. That component 
was originally intended to review the kinds of 
land mobilisation activities then beginning in 
a number of provinces (in particular in East 
Sepik, in East New Britain, in the Western 
Highlands and possibly elsewhere) with a view 
to seeing what common core – if any – in terms 
of provincial approaches, could be found upon 
which a national approach to land mobilisation 
could be built. These tasks were given to a 
private lawyer to develop. Within a fairly short 
time this so-called land mobilisation review 
document seemingly became an official Land 
Mobilisation Policy, despite the fact that the 
draft proposal had not even been considered 
by Cabinet nor even been read by the then 
Minister for Lands (Barter 2001: 1).
As a result student and NGO groups 
organized themselves and major demonstrations 
against a rumoured World Bank take-over of all 
PNG land. The result was that this particular 
component of the Land Mobilisation Project 
was dropped and suggestions were made that 
the registration of customary land would not 
be pursued again. Six years later, with window 
dressing added to the draft act for Customary 
Land Registration, there were attempts to 
have the draft act approved by the National 
Executive Council, ready to put to the National 
Parliament. 
Elsewhere in this discussion paper, Peter 
Larmour notes a number of internationally 
accepted views that consider customary tenure, 
or the absence of title, as being a major obstacle 
to economic development. Though many of 
the same considerations underlay attempts in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s to import land 
registration strategies from Africa to PNG, 
the latest version of this – also mentioned in 
despatches by demonstrators in the middle 
of this year – is Hernando de Soto’s book The 
Mystery of Capital (2000). De Soto pulls together 
much interesting evidence (especially from 
Latin America and Africa), about the lengths 
to which entrepreneurs go to remain outside 
formal state-controlled systems and suggests that 
peasant entrepreneurs would be better off if they 
had title to an area of land and were thus able 
to raise further capital. However, I believe that 
his thesis carries much less weight in Melanesia 
(Holzknecht, n.d.).
Supporters of land registration use a number 
of arguments to bolster their point of view 
(Lawrence 1974: 2-5), namely that registration 
automatically produces development, that the 
individual ownership of land and security of 
tenure enhance access to capital and motivate 
production, and that registration converts 
customary tenure. But even fully committed 
supporters sound notes of caution. One of 
the earliest proponents in Papua New Guinea, 
Rowton Simpson, has noted that:
Land registration must be kept in 
perspective. It is a device, which may 
be essential to sound land administration, 
but it is merely part of the machinery of 
government. It is not some sort of magical 
specific which will automatically produce 
good land use and development; nor is it 
a system of land holding (land tenure); it 
is not even a kind of land reform, though 
it may be a valuable administrative aid to 
land reform. In short, land registration is 
only a means to an end. It is not an end 
to itself. Much time, money and effort 
can be wasted if that elementary truth be 
forgotten (Rowton Simpson 1976: 3).
The introduction of land registration does 
not necessarily contribute automatically or 
directly to agricultural productivity, for it does 
not necessarily alter the nature of tenure nor 
the use of the land. Nor does it automatically 
change the attitudes or practices of the 
farmers on whom productivity depends. In 
South Pacific countries these statements stand 
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on their own evidence as well as on the 
basis of common sense, but there is also a 
high degree of corroboration from evidence 
elsewhere. Experiences from sub-Saharan Africa 
(as just one regional example), where many 
of the negative assumptions associated with 
customary tenure on land and land productivity 
have been shown to be illusory at best, also 
support these statements (Platteau 2000).
These examples quite clearly demonstrate 
that inputs other than the registration of 
land are always necessary to begin to bring 
about these assumed changes. The nature or 
use of land may be changed, for example, 
by reclamation or irrigation works or by land 
reforms; the tenure of land may be changed 
by land law reforms, including the conversion 
from customary to statutory tenure; the attitudes 
of farmers may require a patient programme 
of re-education involving formal courses, new 
institutions, introduction of new crops and 
marketing facilities for them, or new farm 
implements, including mechanisation.
Land registration however, can facilitate or 
complement these other inputs in various ways, 
and this contribution to productivity is valuable. 
‘Various ways’ include: in particular the facility 
for simple, quick and safe methods of dealing 
with land; the facility for mortgaging (charging) 
land as security for longer-term credit for 
development of farms thereby, if banks are 
ready to lend for agricultural purposes, greatly 
expanding the source of available credit; 
provision of security of tenure through guarantee 
of title and reduction of cost and time spent on 
wasteful land litigation (Lawrence 1984: 6).
The issue of ‘land title’ or ‘land titling’ is 
also raised in the context of land registration. 
In the PNG context, customary land is already 
privatised but just not in the preferred western 
mode, i.e. to individuals. Customary land is 
privatised essentially to customary groups; the 
actual land group involved, whether clan, sub-
clan, lineage or other entity varies from place 
to place. ‘Title’ in the western sense has never 
been needed because each such land group 
has been able to establish the primacy of its 
claims and rights over a particular named area 
of land, forest, inshore reef or other resource. 
This primacy is each group’s title in a customary 
sense. This notion of ‘title’ is discussed further 
below.
Background
The issues of land mobilisation and land 
registration arise in the context of a particular 
socio-economic background. I will very briefly 
review some of these since they are of 
importance to what follows (drawn partly from 
Anderson & Parker 2001).
PNG has tremendous potential to harness 
the benefits of a resilient civil society with 
strong social capital based on enduring and 
valued cultural and social traditions, and 
drawing on bountiful natural resources. Despite 
this, there is significant underdevelopment; a 
very large proportion of PNG’s rural population 
do not have access to basic services. They live in 
situations of great economic and social hardship 
and, in trying to improve their lot and that of 
their children; they suffer from a great poverty 
of opportunity. 
PNG’s population suffers from the effects 
of an unstable macroeconomic environment, 
declining per capita GDP, high levels of 
inflation and interest rates, growing external 
debt and a depreciating currency. Sectoral 
trends are not encouraging (agricultural GDP 
fell by 4.3% in 1997 and a further 13% in 1998); 
the delivery of basic services has dramatically 
declined (or, in many cases, ceased altogether), 
for rural agriculture in particular. PNG’s 
social indicators now trail behind those of 
other South Pacific countries. The impact 
of these deteriorating indicators is particularly 
devastating in rural areas, to such an extent that 
life in many villages is now worse than it was 10 
or even 20 or more years ago.
Despite PNG’s status as a middle-income 
country, many social indicators are on par with 
significantly poorer countries. The monetary 
benefits accruing to the country are clearly 
not being translated into broad improvements 
in social and economic indicators. A national 
survey (World Bank 2000) has established that 
some 37% of PNG’s population does not have 
sufficient cash to meet a ‘poverty line’ based on 
income needed to purchase food to provide a 
sufficient energy intake (c. K461/yr/adult). Some 
93% of the poor live in rural areas, where over 
41% of the population live below the poverty 
line. These figures suggest that something is 
going drastically wrong and it is for this reason 
that issues related to customary land tenure need 
to be examined much more carefully to find the 
factors necessary to increase land productivity.
In terms of governance, most of PNG’s 
public institutions are not able to function 
effectively for a variety of reasons – lax financial 
controls, mismanagement and misdirection of 
public funds, corruption, and lack of effective 
sanctioning mechanisms. How does one 
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transform these public institutions into 
accountable, responsive organizations that can 
deliver services effectively? Donors sometimes 
view weak institutions as able to benefit from 
capacity building and training programmes, 
but without more fundamental reforms and 
proper coordination of approaches the impact 
of such interventions is very limited. Longer-
term strategies are needed that will locate 
institutions in a broader Melanesian context, 
take time to understand the incentives and 
processes through which decisions are made 
and resources allocated, and aim to design 
strategies that address fundamental institutional 
constraints (see also Ostrom 1990, 1992).
If natural resources were appropriately 
managed, PNG’s forests, waters and land 
could potentially improve the quality of life 
for much of the rural population. Yet poor 
policies, boundless exploitation by unscrupulous 
developers, corruption at many levels and weak 
monitoring and regulatory institutions have 
all resulted in a significant loss of revenue, 
consequently reducing economic gains for the 
country as a whole, and for the rural population 
in particular. The trust and confidence of rural 
people in public institutions, still left over from 
colonial times, has severely eroded.
Virtually all forested land, for example, 
is managed under customary arrangements 
with interventions being initially made by 
government (through the PNGFA), and later 
by developers. The community management of 
forests is a major challenge and a significant 
opportunity for sustainable economic growth 
and environmental protection. Past exploitation 
however, has led to expropriated revenues and 
fraudulent deals with local entrepreneurs acting 
(usually illegally) on behalf of local groups. 
The survival of community-based land and 
resource management practices is integral to 
the maintenance of social cohesion and to the 
promotion of sustainable development.
Virtually all rural families have access to 
land for subsistence crop production and cash 
sales. Customary land tenure systems have 
provided remarkably resilient tenurial security, 
social stability and equity. From the perspective 
of market-based land ownership systems that 
permit the unambiguous and unimpeded transfer 
of ownership however, customary tenure is 
complex and poses major challenges to the 
mobilisation of land for development purposes. 
Land claims are of significant costs to the state 
and act as a serious disincentive to investment. 
Efforts to develop a uniform, national system 
for dealing with compensation claims have been 
developed and are now under consideration 
(Dwyer & Dwyer et. al. 2000), though those 
proposals are not thought to have reached the 
heart of the matter. 
Issues, Opportunities and Strategies
My introductory comments have by 
themselves introduced a number of salient 
points on which to build further comments:
Land mobilisation/land registration
The ways in which land mobilisation and 
land registration are going to help PNG as a 
whole and, probably more importantly, of what 
help they will be to the ordinary rural person 
are yet to be explained to the PNG public. As 
someone in the backblocks of the Sepik River or 
on top of the Finisterre Range in Morobe might 
ask – “who is going to lend me money here even 
if I have a land title?” If there were a project and 
a business plan in such a location a bank might 
consider them, but how does an ordinary villager 
achieve that?
There are major problems with land 
registration that make it valid to seriously doubt 
that the state is able to implement it in a 
productive, coherent, organized and useful way 
so as to achieve useful and agreed-upon goals. 
If the state cannot even properly manage the 
3% or so of land that is alienated, then what 
guarantee is there that it can properly manage 
100% of PNG’s land? The contention that urban 
land could and should be different is a valid one 
to make, and I will come back to this point 
below.
But we cannot leave it at that. One thing 
stood out very clearly in all the speeches 
made by demonstrators objecting to land 
mobilisation and land registration in PNG: no 
single individual or group presented any viable 
alternatives (other than that put forward by the 
private lawyer mentioned above); there were 
no thoughtful discussions of what choices PNG 
had; no one mediated the extremes of the 
current dual tenure systems in PNG and the 
dreams of narrow economists who possess little 
understanding of what is happening on the 
ground in Melanesia. The one exception was 
the ‘PNG Land Symposium’ (Sullivan, ed. 2002) 
convened at the Divine Word University; where 
many thoughtful and provocative presentations 
were made.
There is an alternative, which is already 
utilized in PNG, and which both the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu are looking at with great 
interest. In 1974, following the submission of 
the report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
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Land Matters, PNG passed the Land Groups 
Incorporation Act [LGIA]. This is a rare law 
that has managed to capture the essentials of 
Melanesian flexibility as they apply to customary 
tenure systems and the people and groups who 
manage and use them. The law was virtually 
ignored for the 12 years following its legislation 
and has since been gradually acknowledged by 
resource developers in both the forestry and 
mining/gas sectors. There are now handbooks 
to help guide the process, resource development 
volumes to help guide communities and so on. 
Incorporated land groups (ILGs) are essentially 
customary land groups, which through internal 
identification of the highest level of decision-
making and a process of registration receive 
modern legal recognition. For some purposes the 
customary grouping (usually but not always a 
clan) will come to the fore but for others the 
modern legal entity can be used. 
As most rural communities are made up of 
more than one such grouping, they need to work 
out how to work together in order to improve 
their community. Each group needs to conduct 
an internal audit of natural and human resources 
and then collaborate with other groups to 
establish community goals and ways to achieve 
them. The initiative needs to come from 
communities, from the grassroots, and then 
co-ordination with local government, provincial 
government and national government is needed 
to achieve these goals.
The ILG process is by no means without 
problems, especially if used, as it is now, for 
activities for which the process was never 
intended. However, in the absence of alternative 
processes that build upon customary systems, the 
ILG process is the only currently operationalised 
process. ILGs, because they are based on 
land groups and their members, are an 
Table 1: Estimated cash income from agricultural sources in rural PNG, 1996
Product Income (PGK)x % of Total Population % of Total
    Income Involvedxx Population
Arabica coffee 65,058,648 33.3 1,505,998 12.0
Fresh food 39,649,224 20.3 3,100,226 24.7
Cocoa 22,009,828 11.3 810,858 6.5
Betel nut & pepper 18,622,028 9.5 1,227,234 9.8
Coconut and copra 16,742,676 8.6 559,433 4.5
Oil palm 6,624,504 3.4 125,511 1.0
Fresh fish, shell-fish 4,595,780 2.4 550,327 4.4
Firewood 4,442,004 2.3 1,032,259 8.2
Irish potato 3,248,112 1.7 573,355 4.6
Tobacco 3,228,714 1.7 694,568 5.5
All other products 2,816,718 1.4 483,328 3.9
Cattle 2,247,186 1.2 544,733 4.3
Robusta coffee 2,057,550 1.1 375,430 3.0
Crocodile 1,110,786 0.6 265,979 2.1
Pelts & plumes 935,550 0.5 187,341 1.5
Rubber 838,934 0.4 140,225 1.1
Pyrethrum 755,052 0.4 130,872 1.0
Cardamom 175,848 0.1 131,415 1.1
Chillies 166,416 0.1 95,602 0.8
Rice 24,408 0.0 4,648 0.0
TOTAL 195,349,966 100.00 12,539,342 100.00
x  In 1996, 1 PNG Kina (PGK) = approx. US$0.76 (A$0.97)
xx People usually have more than one major source of cash income; thus the total population as set out here exceeds the 
actual rural population.
Source: Adapted from Table 9, Allen, Bourke & Hanson 2001: 543.
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ideal method for community development, 
community re-empowerment, and community- 
and area-level planning and implementation. 
Productivity
The assumption that customary resource 
systems are unproductive must be examined. 
As previously mentioned, a high percentage of 
coffee, cocoa, copra exported from PNG comes 
from smallholders working on their customary 
land. Large tonnages of garden greens and other 
vegetables – and certainly not all traditional 
crops – are sold in markets around the country. 
The betelnut market around PNG is likely 
the highest value annual crop for which a 
sophisticated marketing network across PNG 
has been developed (without any assistance from 
the state or from international donors). Table 1 
lists the estimated cash income from agricultural 
sources in rural Papua New Guinea for 1996 
(more recent data is likely to be higher). These 
data indicate that in 1996 just 5 groupings of 
rural products from lands based on customary 
resource tenure make up 83% of this rural 
income – Arabica coffee, fresh food products, 
cocoa, betelnut and pepper and coconut and 
copra – to a total of K 162,082,404. 
Institution-building
Despite the national constitution enshrining 
customary resource tenure systems, since 
independence the state has consistently ignored 
and often actively undermined them in the 
quest for modernisation. Even after the 
demonstrations of five to six years ago the 
trend has continued. What has been ignored 
are on-the-spot, purpose-built customary tenure 
systems, each of which are rooted in the 
environments in which they operate and based 
on active systems of rules that are applied by 
group members. These are customary institutions 
that should not be ignored. Virtually all 
programmes and projects, whether initiated 
by the state or by donors, operate from 
the top down, with little explanation, little 
incorporation into people’s lives and little 
opportunity for the internalisation of new ideas. 
Is it little surprise that when one tries to find 
evidence of previous projects in various parts 
of PNG there isn’t any, or there is very little. 
Where is the necessary capacity building at local 
level and at provincial level that should have 
been part of every project? The real need in 
PNG is capacity building at the local level and 
this can be made more effective by working 
with customary resource tenure systems and the 
people who use them. It is at this level that 
customary tenure systems are grounded and at 
which these systems actively operate.
A brief example from Morobe Province 
(Holzknecht 1997c) will, I hope, tie much of 
the above discussion together.
A population of about 5000 people lives in 
a mid-montane area in the Huon Peninsula in 
Morobe Province. This population has always 
been at the periphery of Finschhafen District 
and so has been the last area to be contacted, to 
be christianised, have administration and so on. 
When independence came in 1975 they realised 
that they would still be at the end of the line 
for ‘handouts’ from the new government. They 
decided that this was not acceptable and that 
they would do it themselves. They set out a 
development plan and now, more than 25 years 
later, the plan continues to be implemented.
Funds raised from growing approximately 40 
tonnes of coffee were used to establish two 
town-based businesses, a successful PMV/bus 
network and a number of trade stores, to raise 
further funds. With help from SIL (a bible 
translator couple lived in the area for years) 
they built an airstrip. They purchased a mobile 
sawmill, cut timber and built a rural sub-health 
centre at the airstrip. They paid cash for a D3 
bulldozer, which the RAAF lifted into the area. 
A few years later they realised that the D3 was 
too small and slow and bought a D6, half with 
cash and half with a loan guaranteed by the 
provincial government (and repaid in 2 years). 
They built a community school and demanded 
that the PG staff it. They worked out that at 
least 25% of their coffee earnings were used to 
pay for freight to Lae, so they planned a road 
from their mountains to the Huon Gulf to join 
the road to Finschhafen. The provincial works 
coordinator opposed the building of the road but 
they themselves said it could be done – this was 
their place. So they built it and invited everyone 
to come to the official opening in mid-1997! 
By this time they had elected their 
development coordinator to provincial 
government and he managed to get some 
funding for the road every year, except two. 
They selected and sent young people, both 
males and females for a six-month paramedical 
training course; each of these had an aid 
post built and regular supplies of medicines 
came from Lae. Their next projects were to 
demarcate their clan land boundaries and to 
develop markets and marketing strategies for 
the wonderful produce they grew. They are 
now growing and processing some 12 tonnes of 
upland rice every year (all consumed locally). 
  Land Registration in Papua New Guinea: Competing Perspectives
23
At present a leadership change is taking place 
from the first coordinator to the next generation 
and this hand-over appears to be taking place 
smoothly. 
Concluding Thoughts
The activities of the community in Morobe 
Province continue, providing an example from 
which others may learn. No doubt there are 
other examples in PNG of goals set and 
achieved: lessons about leaders and the led, 
about building on one’s own strengths, one’s 
group’s and one’s social and cultural strengths. 
We cannot look at land tenure in the abstract or 
without a particular context. That context tells 
us about local institutions (whether customary 
or new), about local choices, local priorities, 
and local risk-taking. It is also about making 
the absolutely critical linkage between rights 
and responsibilities work in real contexts. 
While the issue of ‘titles’ is a valid 
consideration, alternative approaches may also 
be taken. Customary land groups already possess 
customary ‘title’, however title should now be 
able to be confirmed under modern law as well.
In this presentation I have outlined some 
alternative ideas and have show their validity 
in the Melanesian context. It is important to 
underline that I say ‘the Melanesian context’ 
because a very high proportion of that which 
I have talked about will apply equally to land 
issues in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. 
Alternative ideas, opportunities and strategies 
that may be shown to be appropriate, applicable 
and ‘do-able’ in PNG might also validly be 
considered for the other two countries.
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